Smoke and Mist
Mesoamerican Studies in Memory of Thelma D. Sullivan

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Part ii

Poctli, ayauiltl: tenyotl, mauizyotl.
Inin tlatolli: itechpa mitotya in aca tlatoani, ayamo uecauh omic, ayamo poliu in ipocyo, in ayauhyo: quitozequi: imauizo, itenyo . . .

Florentine Codex, Book VI, Chap. 43

Smoke and mist: fame and glory.
This was said about a king not long dead whose smoke and mist, meaning his fame and glory, had not yet vanished . . .

Translated by Thelma D. Sullivan, 1963

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CHIPAHUACANEMILIZTLI, "THE PURIFIED LIFE,"
IN THE DISCOURSES OF BOOK VI, FLORENTINE CODEX

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That body of Nahuatl texts traditionally but erroneously known as the huehueteotlalli or "discourse of the elders" is found scattered through some half-dozen primary sixteenth century manuscripts but nowhere as concentrated as in Book Six of the Florentine Codex which preserves material apparently gathered by Bernardino de Sahagún around Tlatelolco and Tenochtitlan in 1547 (Sullivan 1974: 84). These discourses, which epitomize the elaborate, polysynthetic and metaphoric rhetorical style known as tecpillatolli "discourse of nobles" are verbal artifacts of the merchant, warrior and governing classes of the Mexica elite, of the tlatoque "rulers," teteucin "lords," pipiltin "nobleman by birth," calpuleque "ward headmen," quauhpiptitl "nobleman by achievement," (Carrasco 1971: 351-54), and the pochteca "merchants"--though the discourses more properly representing the latter are found in Book IX of the Florentine Codex, dedicated entirely to describing the life of the pochteca. Consequently, the values, customs and belief systems represented in this Florentine collection cannot be taken as a reliable index to the Nahuatl-speaking world as a whole nor probably even to the specifically Mexica city of Tenochtitlan. As a body, however, the Florentine Codex texts offer an unparalleled access to the ethics and value system of that ruling class which designated itself as the pipiltin of Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco, that is to say, the politically and economically dominant social group in the Valley of Mexico at the dawn of the sixteenth century.

The argument implicit in the present discussion is that the collection of texts preserved in Book VI of the Florentine Codex, whatever the particulars of its provenience, does constitute the essentials of a coherent axiological system but one whose economy and logic adhere according to a mytho-poetic structure rather than according to any "rational," syllogistic consistency. In his highly reasoned and awesomely theoretical analysis of Books IV and VI, clearly one of the most serious studies of these texts available, Eike Hinz takes a contrary position.

The statements in the prophetic texts and in Book VI . . . do not form a unity. This lack of unity of the convictions described is not to be explained away or smoothed over. It does not appear to be explainable by variation among the circles of the different informants since these contradictory convictions can sometimes be found next to one another in one and the same sections of a given text. (Hinz 164)

The latter is unquestionably true, as we shall see, most notably in the "confession" discourse of Book VI. But the failure to find "unity" is just as clearly a function of our Western, syllogistically conditioned critical norms of discourse. There is direct and explicit logical contradiction between a variety of statements in the texts of Book VI, but within a tradition which recognized no syllogistic orenthemematic
imperatives in its discourse, I suggest these contradictions cannot be assumed "natural" and explicit features of either the text itself or of the mind of the informant; they are simply not there. They are illusions, superimpositions drawn from our own discourse models. Where we see flaws and contradictions I am convinced the Nahua informants saw only a seamless unity. Their discourse models are always mytho-poetic and never merely logical.

Certainly, as we know from Sahagún's comments on the evolution of the Florentine texts, there was adequate opportunity for revisions, if either informants or editors had desired. The present study, therefore, poses a literary assumption that the Sahagún text as constituted represents a self-conscious editorial whole, to which the decision to exclude may be as significant as the decision to include and to arrange in a given order. If the Olmos, Bancroft, and other "huehuetlatolli" texts are not literally duplicated in the Florentine texts, as they apparently are not, is it not reasonable to assume that Sahagún and his epigones may have chosen to preserve an indigenous textual purity and unity, established already in the early redactions of the 1540's, rather than turn Book VI into a portmanteau of any and all ethical, didactic, rhetorical, and hortatory discourses of whatever sort by the time they came to translate it in 1577? (FC VI: 260) Our challenge then is to comprehend that purity and see something of that unity.

The word huehuetlatolli occurs only once in a key position in Book VI, in the opening paragraph (quoted below, p. 5) of the discourse on purity and "the pure life" recorded in Chapter 21 (FC VI: 113). The phrase in huehuetlatolli, in ilamatlatolli "discourse of the old men, discourse of the old women" occurs in Book IV (quoted below, p. 13) in a passage which opens the discussion of day-sign reading, the tonalpoalli. In intlatol iquatote "the words of the old men" and in intlatol ilamatique "the words of the old women" each are found once in the climax, final discourse, preserved in Chapter 40, delivered by the parents to the child, boy or girl, about to enter the calmeac, or school of priests of Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl. These attestations are not sufficient to merit use of the term huehuetlatolli as a generic label, unless it is understood as a rough catch-all term for any discourse in which the vast body of traditional learning which constituted the tlamanitilitl "customs and ordinances" was transmitted. Clearly, its attestation in Book IV at the opening of a tonalamati or "book of day-readings" demonstrates that Sullivan is correct in asserting that the term cannot properly be limited to a generic label for didactic or educational orations directed to children. Instead of huehuetlatolli, an examination of Book VI shows that the generic or taxonomic terms tlatlatlauutilitlatolli "discourses of prayer or supplication," tetlapalololitzatolli "discourse of salutation," neiociutilitzatolli "discourse of confession," ineocmaztilitzatol "his discourse of humility," tianeufuilitzatol "discourse of comparisons (similes?)," tetlazotilolitzatolli "discourse of love" (midwife to newborn child), tecpillatzatolli "discourse of nobles," tecuillatzatolli "discourse of the Lord," and finally tenonoztilitzatolli "discourse of admonition" occur in various chapter headings 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, and 4 times each, respectively. Clearly, in the Florentine text the only indigenous terms which can be
said to have some currency are _tlatlaltlahuitlitztli_ "prayers of supplication" because it applies to all the prayers recorded in Chapters 1–9, and _tenonotlitztli_ "discourse of admonition" which designates the orations on personal behavior in Chapters 10–22. In various verbal constructions the latter is also found in numerous other chapter introductions throughout Book VI. In short, while the text offers no single generic term with which to designate all the discourses of "Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy" gathered by Sahagún and Co. for Book VI (though the term _... yoqin iuh tecpillatohualia_ ... and how they discoursed in a noble style" occurs in the heading of Chapter 1, referring to the entire Book), the word _tenonotlitztli_ "discourse of admonition" has more currency than any other.

The vast body of religious, ethical, and aesthetic doctrine by which the fifteenth century Nahua city-states established their laws and ordered their affairs was apparently referred to as in _tlamanitlitztli_ "use, custom, laws, regulations" (Simeón 1981: 610), or "custom or usage of the people, or rules and regulations which they recognize" (Molina 1970: 125v). In the Colloquium of the Twelve manuscript (written in 1564 from notes taken in 1524) the Nahua priests who speak in defense of the ancient religion designate the totality of their customs and doctrines as _huehue tlamanitlitzti_, the "old" _tlamanitlitztli_. León-Portilla has translated the term as "the totality of moral rules and practices" (León-Portilla 1963: 146). I have chosen to translate it "customs and ordinances," referring to the entire body of ritual practice and moral doctrine which grew out of the apparently ancient penitential theology, the cosmogonic myth of five ages, the paradigmatic story of _Topiltzin Quetzalcoatl_, the charter myth of Huiztilopochtli, the _xochiyaoyotl_ or sacrificial "flower warfare" and its accompanying cult, as well as the infinite rituals, prayers, feasts, dances which accompanied and expressed these. The values structure preserved in the Florentine text is but one aspect of this total _tlamanitlitztli_, customs and ordinances, of the Nahua-speaking peoples, but a highly selective and enormously sophisticated aspect, probably still our best insight into the elite-lore of that tradition and a comprehensive image of the best they (sixteenth-century survivors of the conquest) believed their axiology capable of.

It is my impression that this text represents a self-conscious image and presentation of the _tlamanitlitztli_, meaning it simultaneously leans upon and emerges from the multiple elements of its sources; it cannot represent the general range and practice of "moral philosophy" in cities as diverse as Tlaxcala, Cholula, Azcapotzalco, Amaquemecan, Cuauhtitlan and Tenochtitlan by virtue of this self-consciousness which constitutes the very evidence and essence of its claim to an elite status, even within the relatively narrow confines of Mexica political and _calpulli_ structures. Nor on the other hand can it escape the parameters of the mytho-poetic symbol-systems which constitute the common heritage of Nahua-Chichimec traditions. The name of this elite aspect of the "ancient ordinances" is _chipahuacanemiliztli_ "the purified life," supplied in Chapter 21 of Book VI. My purpose here is to outline briefly the paradoxical and oxymoronic yet unified system of images which define the ethical ideals of this "purified life."
The most useful introduction yet available to the contemporary study of these discourses is Sullivan's "The Rhetorical Orations, or Huehuetlatolli, Collected by Sahagún" in Sixteenth Century Mexico (Sullivan 1974c). In that fundamental study she identifies eighty-nine separate orations scattered throughout the Primeros Memoriales, Royal Palace, Royal Academy and Florentine manuscripts assembled by Sahagún, with sixty of these concentrated in Book VI of the Florentine, and sixteen more relative to the life of the merchant in Books IV, V, and IX. Sullivan offered an eminently useful six-part classification of all the Sahagún orations: Prayers to the Gods; Court Orations; Orations of Parents to Offspring; Orations of the Merchants; Orations Relative to the Life Cycle; Miscellaneous. The majority—though not necessarily the textual bulk—of discourses fall into the Life Cycle category, which Sullivan divides into Orations of Pregnancy, Childbirth, Childhood and Infancy, Marriage and Death. Sullivan's classification is an important step in defining, with some critical taxonomy, the generic unities which Sahagún's informants obviously assumed.

In her functional analysis of the discourses, Sullivan pointed out that it was not adequate to call them "didactic prose," as had become customary, and define them as orations intended primarily to educate the young (Cornyn 1941: 317-18; Garibay 1953a: 402, 438; León-Portilla 1963: 192). Cornyn and others were directed to this definition by the fact that the framing image of many, though by no means all, of these discourses is an elder addressing a child, youth, or newlywed. Hence the seemingly appropriate but relatively unattested generic label huehuetlatolli, used by Juan de Bautista as the title for his 1600 publication of discourses, each one of which, however, is called tenonotzaliztlatolli in the text itself (García Quintana 1974: 139). Sullivan indicated the term "enculturistic" as more appropriate than "didactic" for the work they performed in the cultural economy of pipiltin society.

<They> are not didactic discourses as <almost everyone> has called them but rhetorical orations delivered on ceremonial occasions such as religious fiestas (prayers to the gods), the investiture of the King, the departure and return of merchants, banquets, embassies, and all the ceremonials connected with the life cycle. They were enculturistic, not didactic. That is, they transmit the cultural traditions relative to the occasions upon which they are delivered and were a natural and necessary vehicle for such transmission in a society whose form of writing was not adequate to the task of verbalizing the concepts (Sullivan 1974d: see also 1974c: 80-84).

She states flatly that "in Book 6 of the Florentine Codex . . . the majority of the orations are nondidactic in character" (1974c: 81).

Whatever the specific performance contexts of delivery and pedagogical use may have been (a question which cannot be answered by the texts of Book VI themselves), Sullivan also calls them "an inexhaustible mine of information on Nahuatl beliefs and customs"
The axiological vision which informs and orders the orations of Book VI is refined, whole, mythically coherent, and representative of an entire, class-conscious Weltanschauung.

**FIGURES OF THE ETHICAL IDEAL**

The ideal moral condition described in the tenonotzaliztlatolli and other discourses of Book VI is figured in two images: childhood, and a narrow mountain-top path between two chasms. Childhood in the Nahuatl texts is nearly always compared to the most valued commodities of the culture: jade, turquoise, and the long green tail feathers of the quetzal bird. This symbolic complex of precious stones or feathers, childhood, and ethical purity as the Nahua conceived it is nowhere better stated than in the following passage from Chapter 21 of the Florentine collection. It is introduced as the tenonotzaliztlatolli discourse a nobleman delivered to his son, and is concerned in large part with sexual mores. The discourse opens with a general definition of the purified life, in chipahuacanemilti, and those who live it, in chipahuacanemiliceque, describing them as "the precious green stone, the divine turquoise. . . . like them are the dark green, broad, well formed quetzal feathers, arching over the earth."

Here are the words of the elders, that which they gave to us, entrusted to us when they left, the well-guarded, well-guarded words. They said that the pure life is considered as a well-smoked, precious turquoise; as a round, reedlike, well formed jade piece. There is no blot or blemish. Those perfect in their hearts, in their manner of life, pure-living, are like the precious green stone, the divine turquoise, which glisten and shine before the Omnispresent Lord. The pure-living are like the dark green, broad, well-formed quetzal feathers, arching over the earth. They are called the good-hearted.

Listen to what the elders said: The children, the young men and women are the true friends, the truly beloved of the Omnispresent Lord. With Him they live, with Him they rejoice, and become friends.

Because of this, for this reason, the elders, those most devout in penance, in fasting, in offering incense, have special confidence in the children, in the young men and women. The elders awaken their students, their children, while it is yet dark. And while they still long for the pleasure of sleep they strip them and sprinkle them with water. The children sweep, they offer incense. The women wash the mouths of the idols? it is said; The Omnispresent Lord hears and receives their weeping, their sorrow, their sighs, their prayers, because, it is said, they are good of heart, undefiled, still clean, still untouched, still pure, still true jade, still true divine turquoise. So, it is said, through them the earth yet endures: our intercessors.
The term then for the totality of the virtuous life is *chipahuacanemiliztli*, derived from *chipahuac*, "clean, pure," in both physical and spiritual senses; *nemi* "to live"; and *-iztli*, a nominalizing suffix. In Chapter 40, the final oration of the book, an elder kinswoman addresses a young girl about to enter the *calmecac* or academy:

Here is your task, here is what you must do, here is your vow: live purely. . . . Your heart must become a precious jade, a divine turquoise.  

In 1968, while studying Nahuatl with Pedro Flores, a native of Guerrero, I found this word *chipahuac* still used to describe one of the three essential virtues of the Ideal woman. Flores translated it as "limpiacita."

The second image of the ethical life, the path above chasms, is found repeatedly in various discourses throughout Book VI. In Sahagún's Chapter 19, a mother speaking to her adolescent daughter, we find:

On the earth we walk, we live, on the ridge of a mountain peak <sharp as a harpoon blade? *chichiquillí*>. To one side is an abyss, to the other side is another abyss. If you go here, or if you go there, you will fall, only through the middle can one go, or live.  

And in Chapter 21 we find the same image with interpretations:

They used to say <the elders> that on the earth we walk, we live, on the ridge of a mountain peak. Here is an abyss, there is an abyss. Wherever you deviate, wherever you go astray, there you will fall, you will plunge into the depths. That is to say, it is always necessary to act with discretion in whatever you do: in speaking, in seeing, in hearing, in thinking, etc. 

The speaker preface[d] his image in this case by saying "here are a word or two which merit being taken ... for all courtesy, all prudence come from and are derived from this." The same image occurs in Chapter 10, a long discourse addressed to a ruler on the occasion of his investiture, exhorting him to all the qualities of leadership, self-control, piety, and humility necessary to his role (FC VI:53).

The doctrine of the middle way, then, was a central principle in formulating and interpreting this ethic, but this middle way is decidedly not the Golden Mean of the Aristotelian ideal. This thoroughly indigenous conception, of indeterminate antiquity, has its roots in the shamanic complex which Eliade suggests underlies all religious activity and which retained its original vitality throughout many regions of the Americas, even today providing the essential pattern for ritual in a number of cultural areas. Barbara Myerhoff, during her extensive work with the Huichole shaman Ramón Medina Silva, discovered a directly analogous concept of equilibrium at the very heart of Medina Silva's shamanic training. This concept first came to her attention one day when Medina put on a seemingly gratuitous and
very risky exhibition of acrobatic skill by leaping from rock to rock across a river in the barranca, at the very edge of the waterfall, "cascading perhaps a thousand feet." The following day Medina explained his apparent antics, which had not excited or confused his Huichole observers in any way, to the mystified Myerhoff:

"The mara'akame <Huichole shaman> must have superb equilibrium," he said and demonstrated the point by using his fingers to march up his violin bow. "Otherwise, he will not reach his destination and will fall this way or that," and his fingers plunged into an imaginary abyss. "One crosses over; it is very narrow, and, without balance, one is eaten by those animals waiting below" (Myerhoff 1976: 101).

In other words, Medina's exhibit was either a physical rehearsal of a mental and spiritual condition essential to his profession, or a public statement and confirmation of his shamanic credentials, an outward affirmation of inner condition. We almost feel he must have been reading Sahagún's tenonztzalitztlatolli discourses, so explicit is his reference to balance between abysses "this way and that."

Ramón Medina Silva is not the only contemporary shaman Myerhoff has observed exhibiting skill in balance, though Medina was the only one to explicate its meaning. His explanation clarified for her the strange practice she had observed years before on the Luiseño Reservation in Southern California: Domenico, a shaman of considerable reputation, would climb to the roof of his shack every Friday afternoon before his clients began to gather and stand for long periods on one leg. After witnessing and hearing Medina, Myerhoff concluded she had seen in Domenico a similar demonstration of spiritual credentials through an exhibition of physical balance. Her observation on this concern for equilibrium in the shaman summarizes not only the dialectic of training upon which the healer's power and very survival depend, but the Nahua ethical ideal as well, figured in the mountain ridge between abysses.

Shamanic balance is a particular stance. It is not a balance achieved by synthesis; it is not a static condition achieved by resolving opposition. It is not a compromise. Rather it is a state of acute tension, the kind of tension which exists, as <Rafael Jesus> Gonzalez put it, when two unqualified forces encounter each other, meeting headlong, and are not reconciled but held teetering on the verge of chaos, not in reason but in experience. It is a position with which the westerner, schooled in the Aristotelian tradition, is extremely uncomfortable. Unlike the view of highest good as the golden mean, this view gives us few guidelines for action (Myerhoff 1976: 102).

The Nahuatl texts, however, do give a variety of specific guidelines, but they relate almost entirely to universal codes of dress, personal appearance, and drunkenness. In regard to those guidelines through domestic and social dilemmas which we "westerners" expect our various
moral codes or their spokesmen to provide for us—profit vs. theft, prudence vs. avarice, caution vs. cowardice, self-reliance vs. detachment, freedom vs. irresponsibility—the discourses, like the Huichole shaman, are disturbingly (for us) silent.

The juxtaposition of the two images, child-like purity and mountain-climber's caution, gives the polar points of the chipahuacanemilitli. With these as his model Nahua man strove to implement in quallotl in yecytli "discretion, virtue" as human behavior. Divine favor clearly falls on a state of naive innocent devotion, but survival in the world requires maturity and discretion of the highest order. The quality of paradox embodied in such an ideal will follow through at every level of the ethic. Outlining this ethic strictly within an education system, León-Portilla distinguishes the two fundamental principles as self-control and self-knowledge (León-Portilla 1963: 136). These are fine as far as they go, but the principle idealized in the image of a child-like nature could not be described as self-control or self-knowledge. On the other hand, both of these could readily apply to the second principle imagined as the ridge between abysses. Self-control and self-knowledge constitute only one-half of the Nahua ideal, in our own terms, the rational, dominating, knowing half. The other half, the irrational, weak, unknowing and perhaps mystical state figured in the child, incorporates directly and literally into Nahua moral philosophy the ubiquitous myth of eternal return which Norman O. Brown, following Freud, has identified as the universal longing, universally doomed, of all men to return to the psychic protection and security of infancy (Brown 1959: 51-2).

THREE "WORDS" AND THE CHARACTER OF IDEAL MAN

In Chapter 17, a discourse of admonition delivered by the ruler to his sons, the anonymous informant(s) supplies a three-part summation of his counsel, a summation which in fact outlines the entire axiology of the chipahuacanemilitli. This discourse is delivered in iquac ie ixtlamati, ie tlacaqui "when <the sons> are already prudent, already understand things" (PC VI: 87). The narrator characterizes his summation as quen ontentli in pialoni, in niollotiloni "just a few words worthy of being guarded, worthy of being memorized" (PC VI: 91). These "words" are three ethical principles which the ruler claims have been bequeathed from time immemorial. The first is


The ruler's second "word" is

Live in peace near and close to people. Do not be a fool . . . Let yourself be destroyed in whatever manner you are to be destroyed; do not revenge yourself, do not be like a serpent . . .
And the third principle the ruler dictates to his sons is:

Do not waste time, and do not act uselessly on the earth. Do not waste the night, the day; they are as necessary to us as our bones, our flesh, our strength, our food. 10

"Enter close to, near to our Omnipresent Lord”; "Live in peace near and close to man"; "Do not waste time or act to no purpose"—these are the guides which divide the axiology of Book VI into three categories of obligation: those of spiritual, social, and personal realms. All the specifics of conduct, attitude, and behaviour described in the orations of Book VI can be shown to fall under one or the other of these three master principles of the chipahuacanemiliztli or "pure life."

The most graphic description of the man the Nahua believed this ethical system could produce is not found in Book VI, however, but among the tonalamatli or "day-sign book" readings of Book IV. Under the influence of the most auspicious signs—10 Rabbit, 11 Water, 12 Dog, and 13 Monkey—within the trecena (13-count) of 1 Rain the following description is given. This is not be be understood as a strictly predetermined nature which must inevitably fall to those born on these days, but rather as benevolent possibilities which the individual has capability of developing if he adheres to the obligations of the pure life. Toward this the highest energies of Nahua ethics were directed, and so it conceived human character formed in consolidation of the best influences of the gods and efforts of man.

It was said: anyone born under these various day-signs became a highly favored person; he succeeded and endured on earth. That is to say, he was not deflated, not one of the least, nor the last, nor a man without recognition. He was well respected and recognized; he was famed and honored; therefore, he was one who prospered, enjoyed glory, was compassionate and served others. As a chieftain he was strong, daring in battle, esteemed, intrepid, able, sharp-witted, quick-action, prudent, sage, learned and discreet, an able talker and attentive. It seemed as if he set forth his discourse in meditation, full of sorrow and compassion: one who understood others well, who animated and consoled them, and was understanding. To everyone he brought happiness, as much as to comfort the afflicted and provide succor. So of him it was said that he was a deserer of merit, one of good fortune; that all then resulted from the various gifts here mentioned. 11

Such was the ideal character according to Nahua tradition.

NATURAL CONDITION OF MAN

The moral nature of a child born among the Mexica is not described as either wholly depraved or wholly beneficent in the orations of Book VI, neither wholly free and independent nor wholly determined. As
noted, the concept of child-like innocence is clearly significant in the Nahua moral philosophy, to the point of constituting one principle of its ideal. A child is above all things precious, both as a physical being extending the identity of his ancestors and the race, and as a moral being freshly issued from the divine nature. This child does not come tabula rasa, however; he brings with him in ilhuil in imahceual, "his desert, his merit," and in the varying quality of this donnée lies his moral identity. It is fundamental for understanding Mexica personality that we approach a precortesian sense of this term in a culture which has often been described as subserving all individual identity and development to society and the state. The Nahua who provided the orations of Book VI apparently believed man has no single, universal nature, but that each person is born with his own unique combination of moral qualities determining the boundaries within which he may influence his own identity. In order to establish this we must examine the much-discussed but misapprehended Nahua concepts of determinism and fate.

At birth, issuing from Ometeotl (Quetzalcoatl as "Precious Twin") in the thirteenth heaven of duality, the child brings with him this particular charge of "desert and merit," in ilhuil in imahceual, which he is imagined to wear like a jacket or shirt, and which was infused into him jooayan "in the darkness." These are among the first words the baby hears from the midwife who delivers him:

And how will you be dressed? How will you be arrayed?
How have your father, your mother, Ometecutli,
Omechuatli, endowed and arrayed you? How do you come?
To what purpose do you come dressed? Perhaps we have
deserved something, perhaps we have merited something.
Perhaps our Lord, the Omnipresent Lord, will bless you
with something, will favor you with some role. Or
perhaps you are of no merit, deserving nothing. Perhaps
you are born as a little smutty ear of corn. Perhaps
filth and corruption are your desert, your merit.
Perhaps you will be a thief. With what were you adorned;
what was bound to you in darkness?12

This quality of birth-merit is an individual fate which will forever remain the essential component of the child's identity. Though the baby is pure (chipahuac) he is not morally neutral; he may be freighted with incalculably evil tendencies: he may turn out to have a love for alcohol, he may come to desire too much wealth, he may prove a coward or a fool or be unable to control his sexual desires. On the other hand, he may already possess the seeds of unending courage or self-discipline. And since identity is a function of this moral quality, it may be already determined that he will be a poet—or a prostitute. His capability for leadership, war, and even for happiness has been measured. Even the form and value of his death may be determined in the infusion of birth-merit "in the darkness."

Hence the importance of the tonalpoalli "tonalli count" and its book of interpretations, the tonalamatl. Only by means of this complex system of divination can the riddle of individual fate and identity be somewhat deciphered according to the 260 general categories of human
destiny. And so the child is named, according to the signs and influences which the tonalpouhui "day-sign reader" reads in his painted almanacs. Some leeway was apparently possible in this naming process, and informants report that if the birth influences were discovered to be particularly malicious, the parents often waited for the next fortunate sign and named the baby on that day (the child takes as part or all of his name the sign and number of the day on which he is named). In fact, the upper classes regularly waited for the seventh day of the 13-count to name their children no matter when they were born as seven was considered the most auspicious of numbers. This finagling of the birth-merit already indicates a loophole in the web of fatalism.

Alredo López-Austín (1980) has described and analyzed the Nahua concept of tonalli at some length and finds it to be one of the fundamental categories of Mesoamerican thought. Its foundation, he finds, is "the concept of a relationship between mythic time, in which all possible events are already found, and the moment in the calendar sequence when one of the forces from that time penetrates and acts in the time of men" (223). The forces of the tonalli were believed to manifest themselves as light/heat and to spread out across the surface of the earth, infusing all beings. Earth itself was believed to have been maintained by these forces which are each day renewed, López-Austín reports, through the four "sacred trees" which are vias between mythic and human time. In human terms, each force was unique and identified by its tonalpaualli sign (260 possibilities) and was "introduced into the child by means of ritual and remained lodged in him as one of his animating entities, unifying intimately with the individual as his link to the cosmos and conditioning his fortune" (233). The tonalli as a vital force was thought to inhabit animals, plants and objects as well as humans; in the latter it especially concentrated in the head from which it could come and go spontaneously or accidentally. Loss of tonalli, through unconsciousness, drunkenness, sickness, dreaming or excessive sexual activity could be fatal. The fontanelle of infants was especially transparent and vulnerable in this regard. The sun was the primary bearer of tonalli and fire could function as its surrogate; in some texts, López-Austín reports, tleyotl "flame" (or perhaps "fire-ness") appears as a synonym for tonalli. The day-name-fortune-power conferred on an infant at the bathing and naming ritual (which had to occur within the trecenta of the actual birth) "imprinted on him a particular temperament, affecting his future behavior and established a link between man and divine will by means of fortune" (233). Tonalli was the force that determined the level of animating vitality in the individual.

None of this is made explicit in the Florentine texts, but López-Austín finds especially fruitful passages to suggest his analysis in Chapters 37 and 38 of Book VI where the bathing ceremony is described. He does not discuss the phrase in iihuil in imahceual or the term mahceual- "merit" itself. Clearly, however, his analysis of tonalli reinforces the idea of a birth-merit which, while encompassing a fixed field of destiny, is subject to the influence of behavior, attitude and action. The general implication of the word tonalli in the discourses of Book VI, he finds, is to suggest that to a great extent the influences over one's fortune are presented in the form of personal
temperament: "If a harmonious balance is established, the individual could derive the greatest possible benefit from the inclinations and tendencies given him by his tonalli; if not, the tendency could turn into a less positive course, or could diminish its vitality." Furthermore, "the strengthening or damage of the tonalli provoked the intervention of the supreme divinity, either as reward or as punishment, manifested through luck. This, independent of the tonalli's bearer, brought in itself a kind of destiny" (234).

Curiously, the word tonalli, by itself and uncompounded, does not occur even once in Chapters 37 and 38 (describing the specific discourses of the ritual for bathing), but in Chapter 36, which tells how the parents consulted in tonalpouhue, in tlamatinime "the tonalli readers, the wise men," it occurs no less than fifteen times (twenty-four if we count compounds), translated by Anderson and Dibble as "day" or "day sign." In tilhui, in imahceual "his desert, his merit" occurs twice, but only once in reference to the bathed infant.

This idea of birth-merit infused by the tonalli is the marrow of the notion of fate which is the bone of these discourses. Its mythic reference is found in the story of Quetzalcóatl's recovery of the bones from Mictlán and his penitential act of creation which designates the human race of common men in macuealtin, through a punning rhyme with mahceual "merit," as those whose right to existence has been assured by the payment of Quetzalcóatl's phallic blood. The myth defines an immanent power, and Quetzalcóatl as "Precious Twin" (Ometeotl) appears in Book VI as that god who continues to infuse being and moral structure at the inception of each new human soul. This inherent moral quality of being, of varying definition for each individual, is a gift or curse of the ineffable Tloque Naquatl "Omnipresent Lord," who must therefore be an epithet or avatar of this "Precious Twin." Its accompanying emotion of fatalism pervades nearly every aspect of the orations and may be identified in the basso continuo note of awe which sounds in their background. But the fate entailed in birth-merit was not as absolute for the informants of Book VI as some scholars have described it to be in Aztec culture. Soustelle's version is typical, and probably the most widely known exaggeration of the concept:

Indeed, man had but an insignificant place in the Mexican vision of the world. He was governed by predestination: neither his life nor his after-life were in his own hands and determinism ruled every phase of his short stay on earth. He was crushed under the weight of the gods and the stars: he was the prisoner of the omnipotent signs. ... The moral climate of Mexico was soaked in pessimism. (Soustelle 1961: 114-115)

Pessimism, or rather the identification of a painful world, is found all through the Florentine orations, but this "crushing" determinism is not. On the contrary, there are clear statements in the orations of the individual's control over a significant portion, though not all, of his moral destiny. In Chapter 18, one of the master texts of indigenous American literature, the ruler instructs his daughter on her spiritual obligations and indicates that through successful performance of them she may even reverse a malicious birth-merit.
And if an evil birth-merit was bound to you in darkness
when you were arrayed, born, and given motion, then it
will be made good, rectified, and our Lord and Master
Tloque Nauaque will reverse it.14

A girl entering the calmecac for the first time was told:

But whoever is negligent truly of his own will throws
himself from the crag to the torrent, and certainly our
Lord will strike him with some suffering: perhaps
putrefaction, perhaps blindness, perhaps paralysis. He
will live out his life in poverty, enduring misery,
rags, tatters. To the end of his earthly life he will
see poverty, he will be consumed with pain.15

But the most direct statement of personal freedom and responsibility is
found in Sahagún's tonalamatl (Book IV) under the discussion of the
first day-sign 1 Crocodile and its accompanying 13-count. This passage
serves in that Book as introduction to the entire tonalpoalli system of
influence reading.

And they also said: even though <a man> was born on a
good day-sign, if he did not perform well his penances,
if he did not carefully counsel himself, if he did not take,
if he did not accept the punishment given to him
<literally "the icy water, the stinging nettles">, the
castigation, the exhortation, the discourses of the old
men and woman, (then) he only made himself evil and
perverse, not following the way, succeeding in nothing.
Entirely by his own acts he brought himself to ruin,
despised himself, brought harm on himself, failed, lost
through neglect, gave up, and put in danger what might
have been his good merit, his sign, his lot. He
tarnished, polluted, and ruined with debauchery his
birth-merit. Thus he came upon and deserved affliction.
As he was at supper, so he was at breakfast. He was
nowhere happy. Wherever on earth he appeared, misery
consumed him. And truly he brought it upon himself
because of his malice, his disregard for everything,
his shamelessness, his neglect. No one bequeathed it
on him; truly of his own will he brought upon himself
torment and pain.16

These are not simply stray quotations which contradict a prevailing
motion of predestination. They are crystallizations of a concept of
individual freedom, and therefore obligation, which runs throughout the
Florentine texts. Without this freedom the tenonotzaliztlatolli
discourses have no reason for existence or impulse for preservation.
This freedom within bounds is the primary assumption of all the
tenonotzaliztlatolli texts and the axiological system they imagize.
Again and again the elder warns the new ruler, the young man or girl,
to adhere closely to the code being entrusted to him, as it will
strongly influence the constellation of his personal merit. There is
even a hint that the actions of the parents may influence the quality
of birth-merit in their newborn child.
The informants of Book VI give no indication of being intellectually confused or disturbed by the contradictory and logically exclusive nature of their ideas of birth-merit and of moral freedom. Having no tradition of syllogistic rationalism, they had no need for the denial or refutation of such contradictions. They were certainly aware that the morality by which they lived was a system under profound tension, but they did not consider this tension a confusion somehow implying invalidity of the system. It was, rather, a reflection of the creative-destructive tension of the cosmos itself. That their gods should both determine and punish or reward, and that they as individuals should be both destined and responsible, did not seem strange. As part of the confession rite (recorded in Chapter 7 of Book VI) which every Mexica was entitled to perform once in his lifetime, both concepts are expressed, in apparent contradiction to one another, in close succession. The priest, interceding for the penitent, first reminds Tloque Nauaue that concerning the penitent's immoralities

your influence is here. This is not the work of man although he acted it out; although he did it, it was ordained.17

Then later, addressing the penitent concerning the same immoralities, he reverses himself.

When sent here you were righteous and good, as your father and mother Quetzalcoatl created you. But of your own will you defile, dishonor, and dirty yourself, casting yourself into excrement, into filth, by your actions, your living. Truly of your own will you wallow in filth, in garbage.18

The priest considers both qualities, determinism and freedom, to exist simultaneously and continuously both in the individual and in the conditions offered to him. The tonalpōalli represented an elaborate system for deciphering the deterministic quality of any moment in time (time being the agon through which Tloque Nauaue works his influences), and the discourses of Book VI represent an equally elaborate system for directing the strictly limited quality of freedom toward the goal of divine or natural favor and its consequent state of blessing.

While the child at birth may be of various moral hues, the orations of Book VI make it clear that the world into which he is born is dominated by one: evil. Here are the first words addressed to an infant by the midwife on his emergence from the womb:

You are fatigued and exhausted; your beloved father, Tloque Nauaue, the creator and maker of men, has sent you here to reach the earth, here where your kinsman and relatives suffer fatigue and exhaustion. It is hot, it is cold, the wind blows. A joyless place of thirst, of hunger, of unhappiness, of fatigue, exhaustion and torment.

... Truly you will suffer fatigue and exhaustion, for
Our Lord has ordained and disposed that there be pain, affliction, misery, toil and labor for our daily breakfast and supper; sweat, fatigue and labor for food, drink, and clothing. Surely you will endure fatigue and exhaustion.

It is a theme the child will hear again and again in his passage to maturity. For a time in his innocence, in the shade of his parents who cover him like the great silk cotton or cypress trees, he will not realize the evil of the world. Amo *mo*mati in azo guaqualcán, in azo *papacoa tlalticpac* (FC VI: 145). "They do not know if perhaps the earth is a fine place, where perhaps there is rejoicing." It is a theme which finds its most impressive expression in the Florentine tenonotzaliztlatolli discourses preserved in Chapters 18 and 20. Chapter 18 is the address of a ruler to his daughter, and Chapter 20 a nobleman to his son. The ruler equates personal accountability with the realization of man's natural condition:

And now you are already aware, you already observe things to be thus: there is no happiness, no contentment: there is torment, pain, fatigue. From poverty and torment come suffering. The world is difficult in everything, a place to cause weeping, bitterness, and knowledge of discouragement. The wind comes sliding over us with a freezing edge like obsidian. And only that wind relieves the oppressive heat. It is a place of thirst and hunger. This is the sum of it. 20

And the nobleman warns his son that

Certainly <the earth> is a dangerous place, certainly a revolting, disordered place of no rest; a fearsome place of pain and affliction. . . . Here men mock one another and rejoice in each other's misery with laughter and ridicule. Nothing on the earth is to be believed: nothing said or praised or told to you can be trusted. There is only ridicule. 21

The natural condition of man as the informants of Book VI represented it did not make for a happy, benevolent constellation of forces or identities. The individual, infused with a moral energy in the timeless chaos of preternatural darkness before birth, is turned loose to survive or perish according to his own devices in a cutthroat, vicious reality. He may at any moment be confronted with violence of personal, social, or divine origin. He is morally independent but may be doomed; he is freighted with fate but must work out his own destiny in fear and humility. Tragedy, through no fault of his own, is simply the normal condition of everyday affairs. In the rush of this tragic flood, however, the individual has his consolations and sure defenses, particularly the four great compensations:

In order that we not go on weeping continually, do not die of sorrow, we common people, the Lord has given us laughter and sleep; also our sustenance, our strength,
our fortitude; and finally that earthly knowledge by
which men are propagated.22

Beyond these four compensations, man's defense against the pain and
maliciousness of the world is the chipahuacanemiliztli code, principles
of behavior bound together with the blood of his penances, a personal
fortress assembled and refined through centuries of harsh natural and
social conflict and available to every man. In contrast to popular
notions of Aztec culture, the Florentine texts display a broad concern
for the individual and his moral welfare as opposed to that of the
state. Not more than a third of the orations are directed toward the
ruler and the performances of state affairs, and even those are
delivered as a personal imperative to the ruler, whose individuality
and character become, by definition, the state. It might even be
argued that the Nahua concept which defines every individual as a
unique alchemy of good and evil qualities, places an even higher value
on that individuality than our European systems which define all
individuals as functions within universal patterns of original sin, or
tabula rasa, or absolute benevolence, or biological instincts, or
economic class.

The broad function of the ethic, then, is clear: in the arena of
an antagonistic reality the individual must either purge himself of a
malicious birth-merit or guard against the loss of a benevolent one.
He must channel the power of his merit toward the ideals of the
chipahuacanemiliztli, innocence and discretion. The ethic provides the
mechanics for this channeling, purging, and guarding. The divine
sanction, or covenant as it were, for this code is best stated in the
final discourse of the Florentine collection.

Whoever has wept, whoever has sorrowed, whoever has
sighed, whoever has hung his head, whoever has entered
well the presence of Our Lord, certainly he has
benefited himself. Certainly Our Lord will array him,
will grant, will give him to see that which is his
desert, which is his merit. Certainly Our Lord fails
no one.23

A study of the moral philosophy and axiological structure contained in
even one Book of the Florentine Codex can be only superficially treated
in a paper of this length. Much is left out. I have said nothing, for
example, of what is arguably the master virtue of the entire
chipahuacanemiliztli code: in icononemiliztli, in nepechtcaliztli, in
nenomaiximachiliztli "the humble manner, reverencing, the knowledge of
self" which is discussed at length in Chapter 20, the discourse of
admonition delivered by a noble father to his son. Nor has any mention
been made of the terms in which the "pure life" was thought to be
rewarded—in this life or some other, in material or spiritual coin.
Sacrifice and yaaoniquitzli "war death" are linked directly to the "pure
life" in one paragraph of Chapter 21 (FC VI: 114), and the specific
obligations of the three "word" system are enumerated at length in
Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21, and 40.
NOTES

1. See Gladys Reichard, Prayer: The Compulsive Word (University of Washington Press, 1944) for a structural analysis of Navajo prayers based on a reading of Navajo "categories" which "cannot be made to fit ours," and whose order and pattern usually follow "class" associations which are "often quite poetic, but ... can by no stretch of the imagination be considered as scientific categories" (4). More recently Gary Gossen's analysis and taxonomy of the full range of Chamula verbal art in Chamulas in the World of the Sun (Harvard, 1974), has demonstrated decisively the need to examine the verbal art of oral Native American cultures—even those as sophisticated as the Aztec—through culture-specific terms drawn from the discourse models, social systems, and aesthetic canons of the indigenous tradition itself. The Greek-originating assessment of discourse according to a criterion of "truth-value," determined by internally referenced systems of logical consistency or inconsistency, conformity or contradiction, cannot be applied to any Native oral art, to the degree that it retains its preEuropean modes, canons, and style (just as it cannot be applied to the preGreek periods of our Biblical traditions).

2. These questions of interdependence and source among huehuetlatolli texts have not been adequately studied, nor do I propose here to clarify them. It has been suggested, however, that certain portions of the Florentine discourses coincide word for word with passages in the Bancroft dialogues. In a cursory comparison of the two paleographs I have been unable to locate such coincidences. A detailed comparison of selected passages on marriage in the Florentine, Olmos and Bancroft texts revealed no literal duplications—which we know can occur in Nahuatl verbal art because of numerous examples within the Cantares Mexicanos ms. and between the Cantares and Romances de los Señores mss. Instead I find similar advice given in a very different vocabulary and syntax in all three texts. Clearly the tenonztzalitzlatolli discourses are oral-formulaic in composition and undoubtedly varied in each rendition (apparently to a greater degree than the more strictly formulaic song texts of the Cantares and Romances mss.). Undoubtedly the forthcoming publication of the Bancroft Dialogues by Dr. Frances Karttunen will help clarify this question of textual interrelationships.

It seems undeniable to me, however, that the dominant tone of the Bancroft and Olmos dialogues is distinctly Christian and post-conquest, though the Bancroft is an admittedly complex and syncretist later document. No preChristian gods are mentioned by name in the Olmos, though the epithets totecui "Our Lord," ipalémoani "He by Whom We Live," occur in both texts (plus in tlacauindehuagae "He Who is always Near" in the Bancroft) with Christian connotations. No specifically preEuropean administrative, ritual or life-cycle situations are described in the Olmos text. The Bancroft contains a discourse attributed to an elder woman which does name the gods Tezcatlipoca, Huitzilopochtli and Tlaloc, as well as the preHispanic titles of
Tlacatecco, Cihuacoatl, and Quetzalcoatl but only to denounce the
former as "false gods and demons" (96). Her discourse, while it
laments the passing of a harder life-style, is clearly a model of
adaptive, post-Conquest propaganda.

The Florentine discourses, on the other hand, while redacted in a
post-Conquest, Christian context, are completely dominated by a
backward-looking preChristian tone, beginning with the extensive
prayers to Tezcatlipoca, one of the least assimilative deities in
the Nahua pantheon. No Christian deities or saints are mentioned
in these dialogues. But more significantly, the Bancroft and
Olmos dialogues are almost invariably cast in the present tense
while nearly all the chapter headings in the Florentine dialogues
are in the imperfect or preterite tenses: "Here are the words
with which they greeted and with which they prayed to the
ruler after he had been installed" (47); "Here is told how the
mothers and fathers promised that the boys <and> the girls would
live in the calmecac when they were already partly grown" (209).
The headings supplied in the Bautista transcription of the Olmos
ms. are probably interpolations, but they do validly express the
utilitarian, functional tone of that dialogue: "Huehuetlatolli.
Discourse which a father makes to his son, advising or admonishing
him to be good. Exhortation of the parents who thus advise and
instruct their son that he will see fit to live in a correct and
proper manner" (150-151). In the Bancroft we find, for example:
"Salutation of one, who on the way to the market, passes by the
house of her parents" (34) or "Advice from an elder to children
for their good education" (87). (These headings are given in
Spanish in the ms.) The Bancroft also contains a reconstructed(?)
series of discourses attributed to "the king of Tetzoco"
describing how marriage brokers should (or did?) ask for the hand
of a royal bridge. Also, there are discourses for the death of
kings, in the old style, but with an "N"--"nombre"--in the text
for insertion of any current dead "king." The rhetoric of the
Bancroft and especially the Olmos dialogues is a rhetoric purged
of its non- or implicitly anti-Christian ritual associations and
preserving what some churchmen, probably Fr. Andrés de Olmos and
Fr. Horacio Carachi, had determined to be a correctly elaborate
high Nahua style, proper for study and imitation, without the
pagan corruptions of its original usages. Sahagún--while his
chapter headings sometimes point out "these words are excellent,
and the metaphors are very complex, the admonition is very good"--
shows no such interpolative hand in the Florentine discourses.

3. All quotations from the Nahuatl text of the Florentine Codex are
taken from the Anderson and Dibble edition and will be cited as
FC, Book number: page. Translations generally follow the
Anderson-Dibble version, but with variations by the author.

4. Original text of the Nahuatl is taken with alterations, from the
Anderson-Dibble paleograph (1969) and will be given in the
Endnotes.

Ca izcatqui in techonmacatiui, in techonpialtitui in uetzaltolli
in nelpilli, in toptli, in petlacalli: ca conitotiu ca teuxuiatl

Tla xiccaquiy, conitiotii in uuequetqe: ca in pilpititzitzinti, in telpupuchtitzitzinti, in ichpupuchtitzitzinti: uel icnioan, uel itlazoan in tloque, navaoq, itlani nemi, itlan paqui quimicniuhtla.


5. Izca in timailiz, izca in ticmuchiuitliz, izcan monetol, tichipoaacanemiz: ... chalchiuhtiz, teuxiuhtiz in moiollo. ... (FC VI: 217)


7. Conitiotui, ca tlachichiquilco in tiui, in tinemi tlalticpac, nipa tlani, nipa tlani, in campa tonchicopetoniz, in campa tonchicooaaz umpa tonuetziz, umpa timotepexiuiz, quitozneq': moneq' muchiapa monematecachiiaux in quequich muchiao: in mitoa, in motta, in mocuaca in molnami qui , etc. (FC VI: 125)

8. Itloc, inaca ximocalaquican in totecuio in tloque, navaoq, in tlacatl in iooallii in ehecatl: cenca xoconnacac in moiollo, in monacaio. ... (FC VI: 91)

A more direct rephrasing of Christ quoting the Shema in response to a Pharisee's question would be hard to find:

And Jesus answered him, the first of all the commandments is, "Hear, O Israel; the Lord our God is one Lord: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all

535
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy
mind, and with all thy strength. ...” (Mark 12: 29.
Jesus is quoting Deuteronomy 6: 4-6)

The monotheism is less emphatic (and probably an illusion) in the
Nahuatl text, but Tloque Naoaque (“Omnipresent Lord”), Tlacatl
(“Master”), Icoalli (“Night”), Ehcatl (“Wind”) are all epithets
of a divinity conceived as one within an essential duality. I
suspect that further research will generally vindicate the
preCortesian authenticity of the Florentine texts, to whatever
degree “authenticity” was possible in the 1540’s, and point to
explanations other than interpolation and diffusion for these, and
other, remarkable analogues to specific New Testament teachings.

9. yuian tetloc, tenaoc ximonemiti, maca xixtomaoa ... 
ma za iuh xipoliuin, quenin tipoliuz, ma tictecuepili;
in mehan ticoatl ... (FC VI:91)

The second commandment, Christ said, was to love your neighbor as
yourself. It is not necessary to quote the Christian rebuttal of
vengeance law, the often-quoted and never practiced injunction to
“turn the other cheek,” to see the appropriateness of this Nahuatl
“Word” to the Christian virtue of meekness.

10. ma titlanemma, auh ma timonenemma in tlalticpac, ma
ticenquixti in ceoolal, in cemiluitl, in mache totech
monequi, in tomio in tonacaio, in tochicaoco in
tonacatl. ... (FC VI: 92)

Though such an injunction might appear to originate in Christian
denunciation of sloth, this would be the least likely of the
“Three Words” to derive from a Christian source. The necessity of
satisfying a capricious divinity, maintaining a cosmos, and
influencing one’s own rather inflexible destiny— all through
penitential sacrifice— were an absorbing labor for both individual
and society, even if it did not include the Aztec extreme of
“Flower Wars.” Time had a penitential and, therefore,
transcendent value in the indigenous theology, and its character,
influenced by human as well as divine behavior, in turn,
determined the context of all physical (natural) and human action,
stopping somewhere short of cosmic determinism. Time was not,
therefore a commodity to be lightly regarded or wasted. The Nahuatl
theology provided for very little beyond a salvation of works, and
in such system, time becomes the agency of salvation itself: “our
bones, our flesh, our strength, our food.”

11. Mitoc: in aquin uncun ipan tlacatla in izquitoiti in
tonalli: cenca tlacanopiluiani mochiuaya, ualquizaya,
ualnemia in tlalticpac, quitoznequi: amo patzactzintli,
amo zan tetzacuia, amo tlaztinpilu, amo zan can
nenemi, uel iximacho teixpan icac, moteniotia
momauizcoting inic mocuiltonoani, inic mahuitzli, inic
tetlaoicoliani, inic teca mobimani: auh inic tiacauh
inic chicaua, inic yaitlaueliloc, inic amo
tetlazaltoca, amo ixmahuqui, iuan inic mozcaliani, ixe,
iollo, iollotecuicuil, iolizmatqui, ioliztlamatqui, tlanemillani, toltecatl, mimatini: ihuan uellatoa, uellacaqui, ihuquin mitic quite itlatol, choquizo tlacollo, uel teitic acic, tejollapan, teiollali, uel mocaqi, muchi tlacati quipaquiltia, ihuquin teacotlaz, teizical: yeuati inci mitoa, ca ma h ceuale, tlacnopiluiani, ca muchi oncan quizaya, in ihuqui inemactia in izquitlamanli, nican moteneua. (FC IV: 53-54)

12. ... Auh quenami ic otapanaloc, quenami ic otichichioaloc: quen omitzchichiu, quen omitztlamamacac in monan, in mota in ome tecutli, in ome ciomatl: quen tiuitz, tle ic timepantiuitz: cuix itla tecnopil, cuix itla tomazoal, cuix tyitlatiz, cuix itla mitzpoaz, cuix itla ipan mitzioceaz in toctulo, in tlocue, nahoacue: cuix nozo ale iihuili cuix ale ma h ceaulli: cuix tipopoitziintli in ototcecatalii: cuix teuhtli, tlaolli molhuil, moma h ceoal, cuix tecomic, tecacic timialauiz: tle ic otichichioaloc, tle otilpililoc in iooaia. (FC VI: 168)

13. This reading, asserted by Garibay (1953-54, 2: 405), is developed by León-Portilla (1974: 186) from a passage of the "Descent of Quetzalcoatl to Mictlan" story found in the Leyenda de los Soles ms. (Manuscript of 1558). It is not specifically attested, so far as I am aware, in any other sixteenth century source.


itlaueliliocaio, ini atle ipan tlattaliz, in iaquentlattaliz, in itlauilmachiliz, siaq oconcauili, ca ixcoian yneuian oquimochiquiliz in toneuztili, in chichinaquitzli. . . (FC IV: 2)

17. . . ca timeuiltitica, ca amo motlacaocux in mazo oax, in mazo oquichiluh: ca oitaluiloc. . . (FC VI: 30)


. . . nel á ticmihioiuiltiz, á ticmociauiltiz in toneuztili, in chichinaquitzli: ca nel quimitaihui, ca quimotlaali in totcuio: in toneoaz, in chichinacoz, mocococaiz, moquichhuiz, motlapalihuiz in cochcioti, in neuhcioti, itonalli, ciauiztili, tipaliuztili: in qualoz, in ioaz, in quemoaz: nel á ticmihioiuiltiz in, nel á ticmociauiltiz. (FC VI: 167-6)


22. . . Inic amo cemicac tichocatiniemizque, inic amo titlaoculmiqizque in tiemecoati: ieboatl techomamaqui in totcuio in uetzquitzli, in cochiztili: ahu ye in tonacaiuil in tochiacoaca, in toospaoaca: ahu iequene ie ieboatl in tlalticpacaotl,
inic nepixolo. (FC VI: 93)

23. Aquin onchococ, aquin ontlacux, aquin onelciciuh, aquin ontolo, aquin onmopechtecac, aquin uel itlan onmocalaquí totecuo: ca onmocne li ca quimuchichiuiliz in totecuo, quimotlamamaquiliz: quittaz in tlein ilhuil, in tlein ima h ceoal: ca aíac quimonenquixtilia in totecuo. (FC VI: 217)
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